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Towards a new architecture
of the international
financial system
The Bretton Woods agreements left the subject of creation of
international liquidity unsolved. It was the deficit in the US balance
of payments that provided liquidity to the international payment
system. After the 1960s an important part of international liquidity
broke away from government control and went its own way. Its
increase and freedom led to different crises during the 1980s and
1990s. This situation led to think of the need of creating a new
international financial architecture (NIFA), though with little
success. The present crisis has raised again the interest for a NAFI
on which little progress has been made so far except in some
technical aspects, yet without political support right now. The clash
between an Anglo-Saxon and a European vision, quite opposed as
to strict regulation, suggests that progress of the new NAFI will be
slow and perhaps modest.
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All that is occurring in the international economy
cannot be understood without looking back to
the end of World War II and the creation of an
international monetary system, called Bretton
Woods after the place where the agreements were
signed. In these treaties, which set the base for
reconstruction and prosperity in the post-war
economy, there was no reference to how to pro-
vide for international liquidity, that is, means of
payment accepted by all countries.
It was the deficit in the US balance of payments
what eventually provided liquidity to the inter-
national payment system. Until the early 1960s,
despite the weakening dollar due to its
assumed global burden of being the single
reserve currency, the international monetary
system worked reasonably well. The problem
came up when in the early 1960s the dollar
drifted away from monetary authorities and
started going its own way by creating the
eurodollar market, which was made of US lia-
bilities – dollars – managed by banks located in
Europe using them in their regular banking
brokerage tasks, so by applying the multiplier
of such activity, international liquidity in dollars
managed from Europe increased consistently
and increasingly fast.
After World War II, the US balance of
payments provided liquidity to the
international payment system. The
problem came up when the dollar
drifted away from monetary
authorities.
This liquidity beyond governmental control
soon shook off its basic function, namely 
to serve the real economy in its international
aspect, i.e. serving the current account and capital
balance. And this occurred after all because 
the amount of such uncontrolled international
liquidity, together with the one still in govern-
mental hands, became higher than what the
international economy required to work properly.
In that moment a new era started in international
economic relations.
The 1980-1998 crises 
and the new international
financial architecture
Without exaggerating, it can be said that the
story of international financial economy since
the first oil crisis (1973) is that of ups and
downs in international liquidity become an
economic branch with own management and
goals, looking for profitability of its own. Hence
those managing this international liquidity
(banks, retirement funds, investors, etc.), often
termed speculators with good or bad reason, are
out for benefits through normal opportunities
and also by taking advantage of imbalance in
national economies.
The story of international financial
economy since the first oil crisis
(1973) is that of ups and downs in
international liquidity.
These manipulations initiated a period of finan-
cial crises stretching over the last two decades of
the last century. The first and most relevant one
was the debt crisis of developing countries,
especially Latin American ones, bred in the
1970s and broke out in 1982. It was followed 
by the crisis of the European Monetary System
in 1992-93, that in Mexico in 1994, Southeast
Asia in 1997-98 and the Russian rouble one in
1998. In all cases, the international financial
system mobilised resources that had made
these crises possible.
Due to all these events, the need to find a so-
called new international financial architecture
(NIFA) was started to be dealt with in order to
make free capital movements compatible with
national stability and progress policies as the
former were becoming generalised from the
1980s. Also, the question was which role should
international bodies play in this new architecture,
especially the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Of course, the ultimate and basic goal
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was to avoid financial crisis that was striking
the world economy so often.
There was a need to find a so-called
new international financial
architecture in order to make free
capital movements compatible with
national stability and progress
policies as the former were
becoming generalised from the
1980s.
This issue created a big interest in the 1990s
and virtually all big political and academic
institutions had their say in it. In this respect,
we would like to point out the 1999 Meltzer
report ordered and submitted by US Congress
and the report of a taskforce sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations, also from 1999.
Based on these recommendations and the 
created atmosphere, some progress was made.
The need for more transparency was accepted,
and in this respect, the IMF started a quick
programme to collect and disseminate data
published in the internet on a monthly basis
(Special Data Dissemination System). There was
also progress towards so-called «codes of good
tax and monetary conduct» the IMF also took
charge of.
Although all these proposals and other similar
ones were on the right track, the underlying
idea was – wrongly, as it has turned out – to
foster maximum freedom of capital movement
and financial deregulation. It was considered
that most problems were coming from vulnera-
bility of national banking systems and it was the
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Those managing international liquidity are out for benefits through normal opportunities and also by
taking advantage of imbalance in national economies.
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latter that had to adapt to the new international
framework to get the maximum out of globalisa-
tion of international financial markets. Economic
Reaganism was thus fully validated.
The underlying idea was to foster
maximum freedom of capital
movement and financial deregulation.
The present crisis
If this efforts made in the 1990s to create a
NIFA had materialised, could the present crisis
have been avoided? It is difficult to say. What
we do know is that the root of the problems was
never addressed. Instead, the certainty that
freedom and transparency were the best food for
international financial markets became a com-
monly assumed idea. The markets, they said,
regulate themselves and much care had to be
taken not to interfere with this process.
The 2000-01 technological stock crisis helped in
completing the foundations of this philosophy.
This was done by Alan Greenspan, the then
president of the US Federal Reserve. His attitude
towards finding the way out of that crisis was to
trigger an aggressive policy of cheap and abun-
dant money. This permissive monetary policy
was joined by an expansive tax policy under the
Bush administration (2001-09). All in all, the
foundations were laid to create the credit bubble
that is at the base of the present crisis. The
expansive American policy became general all
over and capital flows from surplus countries
(China, Japan, oil exporting countries, etc.) were
feeding fellow bubbles: real estate in different
countries (US, UK, Spain, etc.), commodities
(oil, food, etc.) and stock exchange, these being
the most prominent ones.
The financial instruments used to
create the great expansion after 2003
have turned out to be worthless,
causing the economy to collapse.
The halt of he housing price increase in the
United States was the trigger that burst the 
different bubbles, unleashed by the infamous
subprime mortgages, with effects that have
reached the four corners of the world. The
financial instruments used to create the great
expansion after 2003 have turned out to be
worthless, causing the economy to collapse, with
the severe consequences this has had on our
lives. That construct had been huge. McKinsey
& Company estimated that in 2005, overall
international financial assets had increased to
316% of global GDP, when in 1995 they were 
at 109%. The genius that had come out of the
bottle in the 1960s, that is, that international
liquidity that, as we have seen, escaped from
control by monetary authorities had become a
big monster, just like in the famous fairytale of
the thief from Baghdad. The problem is how to
control it now it has clearly shown how dangerous
and destructive it is.
A new NIFA: so far, words
and ideas
As far as we can see, the discussions and pro-
posals on the NIFA in the 1990s were quite
useless. In fact, they were counterproductive to
a certain extent as they did not expect the
effects of full freedom of movement of capital
and deregulation without any hurdles that for
instance exempted hedge funds from supervision;
they were already causing some troubles, such
as the Long Term Capital Management fund
that had to be rescued in 1998.
That international liquidity that
escaped from control by monetary
authorities had become a big
monster.
The present crisis and the strong involvement
of the finance sector in it has again triggered
efforts to find a second version to the NIFA.
All alarms are on, and the task to rethink the
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international financial system is on the roll
again; this effort had been left half way as
things were improving again, or at least they
seemed to.
As opposed to the NIFA in the 1990s, politicians
have taken the lead now. Then it were the
experts who were at the forefront of the NIFA
and the countless reports published, of which
we have mentioned the two most important
ones. Now the situation is more theatrical, with
governments in the headlines day after day.
Within this somehow exhibitionistic trend,  
a G-20 conference was held in Washington in
November 2008. Its outcome was quite a long
notice containing demands of specific studies to
forward suggestions to bring more order into
the world economy, more precisely to the inter-
national financial system.
Some meetings at the highest level of eurozone
and overall EU countries have created some 
initiatives. There are also some interesting
reports like those by Otmar Issing and Jacques
de Larosière. However, the whole process of
the second NIFA has not gone beyond words
and ideas yet.
I think it is interesting to describe the most
important items upon which a given technical
consensus seems to be built, though it is difficult
to know if it is also shared at political level
given the great amount of unclear statements
by governments.
As opposed to the NIFA in the
1990s, spearheaded by experts,
politicians have taken the lead now.
The first point in this possible agreement is the
need of systematic supervision of the financial
system. So far, supervision was done within
each institution and did not seize the implica-
tions of the dense network of financial relations
between institutions from different countries. 
It seems obvious that only a global vision of 
the system can provide information on its 
systematic risks.
The second possible point of consensus is very
much related with the first one. It is the now
apparent need of regulation with a global
reach. In this respect, the existence of a supra-
national regulating body would be a top goal
difficult to meet. The alternative idea is therefore
stronger coordination between national 
regulating and supervising bodies. It would be
desirable that such collaboration had an institu-
tional framework, either the IMF, the Bank 
for International Settlements in Basel, the
Financial Stability Forum or any cooperative
arrangement between the three. At eurozone
level, this coordination task could be taken over
by the European Central Bank (ECB). What the
present crisis has made clear is that the current
fragmented regulatory and supervisory system
cannot live up effectively to a global financial
system.
New systemic supervision of the
financial system and the 
establishment of global regulation
needs to be reached.
The third point on which there seems to be
consensus, at least at technical level, is the need
of extending regulation and supervision to all
financial activities, sectors and organisations. In
the present crisis, many problems have arisen
from a lack of supervision of very large market
segments such as hedge funds, derivatives,
investment banking and other financial stake-
holders having played a relevant role in creating
the crisis. This means of course to extend finan-
cial regulation and supervision far beyond its
present borders.
The fourth point that seems to gain advocates
is the need to count with mandatory higher
capitalisation levels in all segments of the 
system, especially banking. The current crisis
has proven the fragility of the banking system
and the importance of having a good capital
base instilling more confidence. This should be
combined with more demanding requirements
of risk management and a policy of provisions
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that are increased in times of expansion, as has
been done in Spain.
A fifth point of agreement, this time also at
political level, is to establish a less abusive
remuneration system in the finance sector,
much more related to benefits and the medium
and long term. The current crisis has made it
clear that the incentive system in the finance
branch has been extremely perverse as it has been
stimulating quick and easy profit.
Many problems have come from a lack
of supervision of very large market
segments such as hedge funds,
derivatives, investment banking and
other financial stakeholders.
A sixth important point is wide support for
enlarging the IMF related to both its resources
and its future mission in a wider and stricter
regulatory framework. This is not an easy matter
as any change in the Fund means an alteration
of the political balance. The apathy the IMF
used to work with has been shaken by the
needs of many countries that have had to ask
help from it. It is therefore thought that it will
be necessary to at least double its resources, 
a goal reinforced by European leaders in the
February meetings.
Conclusion
The present economic crisis has led to consider,
for the second time in the last twenty years, the
need of looking for a new international financial
architecture able to set the foundations of a
system that avoids crises like the present one
and allowing harmonious growth of the world
economy. Little progress has been made,
though the crisis has been around for a year
and a half. And progress will be slow and difficult
because changing such a complex system as
international finance is not easy at all and, as
occurred already in the 1990s, there are two
hardly compatible philosophies facing each
other: the Anglo-Saxon, refusing too wide and
strict regulation, and the European, looking for
more control over the system. It is possible that
these two attitudes eventually meet in the mid-
dle in the best of cases, thus not changing
things a lot, as it already occurred the first time
the issue was addressed twenty years ago.
Change in international finance
confronts two hardly compatible
philosophies: the Anglo-Saxon,
refusing too wide and strict regulation,
and the European, looking for more
control over the system.
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The novelties of the summit
The second G-20 meeting held in London ended with a notice dated on April 2. Its most relevant novelties are
the following:
At the G-20 meeting in London a new Financial Stability Council has been established and reinforcement of
international financial institutions agreed.
Regarding supervision and regulation, a new Financial Stability Council is established, which is a
continuation of the Financial Stability Forum but with enlarged membership (the G-20 countries, all the
former Forum members, Spain and the European Union) and a new mandate. It is specifically asked to
restructure regulating systems to better identify and struggle against macroprudential risk; extend
regulation and supervision to all major institutions, including hedge funds; implement the principles on
compensation in the banking sector proposed by the Forum; take action to enlarge the capital base in the
banking sector; take action against tax havens and other non-cooperating jurisdictions; improve asset
assessment and procurement standards; and extend regulation and supervision to credit rating agencies.
The other major contribution is reinforcement of international financial institutions. IMF resources are
trebled to 750 billion dollars, and it is agreed that this institution will issue 250 billion worth special
drawing rights. Regarding multilateral banks of development, there is agreement on enlarging their capital
by 100 billion dollars. This commitment and further included in the notice amounts to a resource injection
of 1.1 trillion dollars, although a relevant part had already been committed previously, according to
analysts.
As to the rest, there are no relevant news. As can be stated, many supervision and regulation issues on
which there was consensus appear in the notice. However, the intensity of such regulation and the
procedures to implement it are blurred. As to the 1.1 trillion dollars in new funds, it is considered that
they compensate the lack of agreement to go on increasing the tax packages due to Europe’s opposition.
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